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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Appellee/Respondent, : 
v. : 
JOSEPH P. TUNZI, : Case No. 
Ct. of Appeals No. 990647-CA 
Appellant/Petitioner. : Priority No. 12 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to summarily 
reverse Appellant's conviction and instead incorrectly remanding 
this case uto the trial court for preparation and approval of xa 
statement of evidence or proceedings7" where a transcript of one 
full day of trial in a two-day trial is not available. 
Preservation. This issue may be raised for the first time 
on appeal since the lack of transcript constitutes exceptional 
circumstances which would result in manifest injustice unless 
reviewed. See generally State v. Verikokides, 925 P.2d 1255, 
1256 (Utah 1996)(reviewing claim raised for first time on appeal 
that absence of complete record violated Article I, section 12 of 
Utah Constitution). Petitioner/Appellant Joseph Tunzi 
("Petitioner" or "Joseph") raised this issue in the Court of 
Appeals by filing a motion for summary reversal. See Addendum A 
containing motion for summary reversal. 
Standard of Review. The underlying issue of whether the 
lack of a sufficient transcript to adequately review Joseph's 
trial requires a new trial involves a question of law. See 
generally State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 447 (Utah 
1983)(concluding that lack of complete transcript required new 
trial). This Court therefore "review[s] for correctness the 
legal conclusions of both the trial court and the Court of 
Appeals." Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 102 (Utah 1992). 
OPINION BELOW 
In response to Joseph's motion for summary reversal, the 
Court of Appeals issued an Order of Remand. A copy of that Order 
is in Addendum B. Joseph petitions this Court for certiorari 
review of that order. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
A party may petition for certiorari review of an order of 
the Court of Appeals. Utah R. App. P. 45. The Court of Appeals 
issued its order on November 30, 1999. This petition for writ of 
certiorari is therefore timely. 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, RULES AND STATUTES 
The text of the following constitutional provisions, rules 
and statutes is in Addendum C: 
Art. I, § 12, Utah Const.; 
Art. VIII, § 1, Utah Const.; 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-105 (Supp. 1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602 (1996); 
J. Admin. R. 4-201. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Pursuant to the Serious Youth Offender Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3a-602 (1996), the state charged Petitioner with Attempted 
Homicide, a second degree felony. R. 9. The juvenile court 
bound Petitioner over for trial. R. 12. 
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Prior to trial, the state filed a motion to admit the out of 
court statements of Zebulin Smith ("Zeb"), which Petitioner 
opposed. R. 28-34, 80. 
A jury trial was held on April 22-23, 1999. R. 76-77. The 
jury acquitted Joseph of Attempted Homicide, and convicted him of 
the lesser charge of Aggravated Assault, which had been requested 
by the state. R. 77, 73, 108. On June 9, 1999, the trial judge 
sentenced Joseph to serve zero to five years at the Utah State 
Prison. R. 117. 
Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal and supporting 
documents in the trial court. He also filed a timely docketing 
statement, a copy of which is in Addendum D, in the Court of 
Appeals. Issues outlined in the docketing statement were (1) 
whether there was insufficient evidence to convict Joseph of 
Aggravated Assault, and (2) "[w]hether the trial court erred in 
failing to remand the case back to juvenile court." See 
Addendum D. Counsel for Petitioner thereafter learned that the 
Third District Court was unable to locate the videotape of 
April 23, 1999, the second day of trial, and that a transcript of 
that day of trial is therefore not available. R. 136, 141:194. 
On October 22, 1999, Petitioner filed a motion for summary 
reversal. The state requested an extension of time to respond in 
order to "try to find the missing part of the record." See 
Addendum E. Thereafter, the state filed its response, agreeing 
that summary reversal was appropriate. The state responded in 
part: 
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Because appellant is asserting that the evidence is 
insufficient to support his conviction, the absence of 
a transcript for a full day of the two-day trial makes 
appellate review and reconstruction of the record 
difficult, if not impossible. See State v. 
Verikokides, 925 P.2d 1255, 1256 (Utah 1996); State v. 
Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 446-47 (Utah 1983). It appears, 
therefore, that to preserve appellant's state 
constitutional right to appeal, the appropriate remedy 
is a new trial. See State v. Verikokides, 925 P.2d at 
1256; Taylor, 664 P.2d at 446-47. 
State's Response to Petitioner's Motion for Summary Reversal at 
1-2; see Addendum F. 
Despite the inability to adequately pursue an appeal because 
a substantial portion of the record is missing, and the 
impracticality and unfairness of requiring the parties to attempt 
to recreate all of the testimony and legal discussions which 
occurred in a full day of trial held eight months ago, the Court 
of Appeals disregarded the state's stipulation of reversal, and 
remanded the case for reconstruction of the record. In so doing, 
the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with 
decisions of this Court, and has violated Joseph's state 
constitutional right to appeal as well as his rights to due 
process and equal protection. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO CONVICTION 
A transcript of only the first day of trial exists. On that 
day, five witnesses testified. R. 141:151. The state also 
called Zeb Smith, who invoked his Fifth Amendment protection and 
did not testify on that day. R. 141:151. 
None of the witnesses who testified on the first day of 
trial identified Joseph as the person who stabbed John ("Rocky") 
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Vigil ("Rocky"). In fact, the only person who identified a 
stabber implicated Zeb Smith and indicated that it was not Joseph 
who hit Rocky. R. 141:129. 
This incident occurred on Halloween night, 1998. A party 
was going on at a neighbor's house, and Rocky and his friends 
were in Rocky7s hot tub. Gilbert Leyba ("Gilbert"), Rocky7s 
close friend, got out of the hot tub and flirted with some girls 
who were at the nearby party. Shortly thereafter, Zeb and 
Petitioner approached. Rocky and Gilbert got out of the hot tub 
and stood at the gate while a verbal altercation occurred. 
Zeb was agitated and yelled things at Rocky and Gilbert like 
xx[d]o you want some of this?" Rocky responded with things like, 
xx[w]hat are you going to do about it?" R. 141:105. 
Gilbert was standing right next to Rocky when Rocky was stabbed. 
Zeb took a few swings at Rocky. R. 141:105. According to 
Gilbert, Zeb hit Rocky, and it looked as if he hit him in the 
neck. R. 141:105. Gilbert testified that he saw where Zeb7s 
blows landed, and he specifically described those blows: 
There was a few of them that hit--had hit him in the--
in the head and the one specifically, I remember 
[Rocky] being punched in the neck, what happened to me 
being--because he slouched down right away, had his 
hand over his neck and he started to push me back out 
of the way and trying to close the gates. 
R. 141:105. Gilbert did not see the knife. R. 141:105. Gilbert 
consistently testified that he saw Zeb hit Rocky in the neck, and 
that it was not Joseph who hit Rocky. R. 141:129. 
Immediately after Zeb hit Rocky in the neck, Rocky held his 
neck and tried to push Gilbert out of the way and get the gate 
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closed. R. 141:106. When Gilbert and Rocky got back inside 
Rocky's house, Rocky lay on the floor and there was a lot of 
blood. R. 141:106. Blood was coming out of Rocky's neck and he 
was making choking sounds; this was when Gilbert realized Rocky 
had been stabbed. R. 141: 106. 
After Gilbert called 9-1-1, he went back outside and heard 
the girls he had flirted with earlier telling Zeb that he better 
leave or he would be charged with murder. R. 141:13 0. The girls 
were trying to block the license plate of a white car. 
R. 141:111. Zeb got into the car and drove away. R. 141:111. 
Later that evening, Zeb returned to the scene in the white 
car. R. 141:113. Gilbert "thought it was crazy for him to come 
back, 'cause after what [Gilbert had] seen him do and all that, 
[Gilbert] couldn't believe that he came back.'" R. 141. Gilbert 
pointed Zeb out for police, saying Zeb "was the guy who did it." 
R. 141:131, 114. He also told police he was "a hundred percent 
certain" of this. R. 141: 114. Police surrounded Zeb's car, 
drew their guns, made Zeb get out of the car and arrested him. 
R. 141:114. 
Terry Martinez ("Terry") was also with Rocky and Gilbert. 
He did not see the stabbing, but thought that Zeb's mannerisms 
after he returned to the scene feigned innocence. Terry 
testified that Zeb's "mannerisms ... seemed to present that he 
was acting--was the notion, the impression that there was nothing 
going on." R. 141:175. 
The marshaled evidence against Joseph from the first day of 
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trial was Gilbert's testimony that Joseph was present when 
Gilbert saw Zeb hit Rocky in the neck, and testimony from Zeb's 
good friend, Joshua Knox ("Joshua"), that Joseph was wearing a 
bulletproof vest and possibly had a knife. R. 141:137, 139. 
Prosecutor: Did you--did--did you see [Joseph] holding 
anything, that night? 
Joshua: Well, I couldn't--I couldn't really be sure 
but it looked like he was holding a knife when he was 
sitting down by my T.V., but I can't — can't really say 
'cause it was all covered up. I mean, I wasn't really 
sure, so ... 
R. 141:139. Many of Joshua's friends carry knives, and although 
Joshua did not see Zeb with a knife that night, Joshua did not 
search Zeb, and Zeb might have had a knife on his person. 
R. 141:144. Joshua also testified that he was fairly close to 
Zeb before Zeb got in the car and fled, and did not notice any 
blood on Zeb. R. 141:145. 
The surgeon who treated Rocky also testified on the first 
day of trial. He testified that although Rocky's wound to the 
neck was extensive, neither the carotid artery nor the jugular 
veins were severed. R. 141:188. While massive bleeding occurs 
when the carotid artery or jugular veins are severed, such 
severance did not occur in this case. R. 141:188. 
The minute entry for the second day of trial shows that the 
state called five witnesses on that day. R. 77. Zeb Smith had 
counsel with him and was one of those witnesses. R. 77. 
Apparently, Zeb is the only witness who made statements 
implicating Joseph. The nuances of Zeb's testimony are critical 
to a determination of whether sufficient evidence existed to 
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convict Joseph of the lesser offense of Aggravated Assault. 
Given the unequivocal testimony from Gilbert that Zeb, not 
Joseph, made contact with Rocky, and that Rocky immediately went 
down and Zeb and Joseph left, the precise, transcribed testimony 
by Zeb is critical to resolution of the meritorious insufficient 
evidence claim which exists in this case. 
A transcript of Zeb's precise testimony regarding statements 
he attributed to Joseph is also necessary. Zeb made inconsistent 
statements to police officers and at the preliminary hearing 
regarding statements that Joseph purportedly made to Zeb. 
According to a pretrial memorandum filed by the state, Detective 
Prior claimed that Zeb told him Joseph said, WI cut him." R. 28. 
At the preliminary hearing, however, Zeb denied making that 
statement to Detective Prior and instead testified that Joseph 
said, usomeone got stuck." R. 28. Because a transcript of Zeb's 
testimony does not exist, the precise statement Zeb attributed to 
Joseph at trial does not exist. Nor does the cross-examination 
regarding Zeb's inconsistencies exist. 
Nine exhibits were identified and received the first day of 
trial. It is unclear from the record whether the state's 
remaining exhibits were identified or received, or the context in 
which they were introduced. 
SUMMARY 
The Court of Appeals erred in denying Petitioner's motion 
for summary reversal and instead mandating that the parties and 
trial court reconstruct the record. While reconstruction may be 
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appropriate in some circumstances where only a minor portion of 
the record is missing, or where the missing portions are fairly 
straightforward, it is not appropriate where half of the trial, 
covering a full day, is missing. 
Petitioner's claim of insufficient evidence is fact specific 
and depends on subtle nuances in the testimony. Petitioner's 
second docketed claim may also require a complete transcript. 
Moreover, a potential claim regarding the state's request of a 
lesser included instruction which is not a Serious Youth Offender 
offense as well as the need for appellate counsel to review this 
case to determine whether a claim of plain error or ineffective 
assistance exists require a complete transcript. Petitioner is 
unable to fully exercise his state constitutional right to appeal 
if required to work from a reconstructed record. Additionally, 
the Court of Appeals' requirement that the extensive portion of 
the record which is missing be reconstructed is fundamentally 
unfair. Petitioner is treated differently from other defendants 
similarly situated since he is required to rely on general 
memories rather than a specific transcript of proceedings. Given 
the extensive portion of the transcript which is missing, the 
importance of specific testimony rather than general memories to 
this case, and the potential existence of undocketed issues, 
reversal of the conviction is required in this case. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT. PETITIONER'S STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
APPEAL AS WELL AS HIS RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL 
PROTECTION ARE VIOLATED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS7 ORDER 
DENYING SUMMARY REVERSAL AND INSTEAD REMANDING THE CASE 
TO THE TRIAL COURT "FOR PREPARATION AND APPROVAL OF XA 
STATEMENT OF EVIDENCE OR PROCEEDINGS' PURSUANT TO UTAH 
R. APP. P. 11(g) WHERE A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THE 
RECORD IS MISSING." 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantees a 
constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction. 
Verikokides, 925 P.2d at 1256. This Court has recognized "that 
the almost complete absence of a trial transcript makes appellate 
review impossible because it precludes meaningful review of the 
lower court's decision." Verikokides, 925 P.2d at 1256 (citing 
inter alia Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318, 1319-20 (Utah 
1987); Taylor, 664 P.2d at 447; Sawyers v. Sawyers, 558 P.2d 607, 
608-09 (Utah 1976); Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah 
App. 1987)). This Court has likewise recognized that "'criminal 
defendants have the right to xa record of sufficient completeness 
to permit proper consideration of [their] claims.'" State v. 
Menzies, 845 P.2d 220, 241 (Utah 1992)(quoting Draper v. 
Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 499, 83 S.Ct. 774, 781, 9 L.Ed.2d 899 
(1963)); see also City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 
513, 519 (Utah 1990)(Durham, J., dissenting)("contemporary 
understanding of the concept of criminal appeals mandates at 
least review of convictions upon a record by a superior tribunal 
for purposes of detecting procedural and evidentiary errors, as 
well as constitutional ones'7) . 
In Taylor, 664 P.2d at 447, this Court reversed a criminal 
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conviction because an incomplete transcript of voir dire 
precluded review of the defendant's claims regarding the adequacy 
of the voir dire. As was the case in Taylor, adequate review of 
Joseph's claims is impossible since the transcript of half the 
trial is missing. Moreover, appellate counsel in unable to 
review the transcript for plain error.1 
Article VIII, section 1, Utah Constitution, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-56-105 (Supp. 1999) and J. Admin R. 4-201 require a district 
court to make a record of its proceedings. See Briggs, 740 P.2d 
at 282. The failure to provide a record of the second day of 
trial violates this statutory and constitutional requirement. 
The statutory and Article VIII, section 1 requirement that 
the district court make a record of all proceedings is critical 
because "it is impossible for an appellate court to review what 
may ultimately prove to be important proceedings when no record 
of them has been made." Id. While recognizing that "prejudicial 
error can result from failure to make a complete record," this 
Court upheld the trial court's order granting summary judgment in 
Bricras only because it could glean from the record the facts 
relevant to the isolated issue being raised. By contrast, the 
present case involves complete review of a criminal trial for 
errors affecting the outcome, not review of an isolated summary 
judgment claim. 
1
 In an unpublished order in State v. Rudolph, Case No. 
950057 (September 21, 1995), this Court granted the defendant's 
motion for summary reversal and vacated first degree felony 
convictions under circumstances similar to the present case. 
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The complete review afforded Joseph includes a review for 
plain error or ineffective assistance, as well as a review of the 
issues docketed in the docketing statement, including the 
meritorious claim that the state failed to present sufficient 
evidence to convict Joseph of Aggravated Assault. Any attempts 
at reconstruction of the record would preclude a review for plain 
error or ineffective assistance; in all likelihood, if any such 
error existed, trial counsel would not be aware of the error so 
as to identify it in the reconstruction process. Errors not 
recognized or recalled by trial counsel would not appear in any 
reconstructed record. Whereas appellate counsel ordinarily 
reviews a transcript for such error, that aspect of the review 
made on appeal is not afforded Joseph under the Court of Appeals' 
order. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the 
importance of an accurate and complete transcript in order to 
pursue an effective appeal. See Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 
277, 282 (1964)(stating u[w]e conclude that this counsel's duty 
cannot be discharged unless he has a transcript of the testimony 
and evidence presented by the prosecution"); Britt v. North 
Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 92 S.Ct. 431, 343, 30 L.Ed.2d 400 fn. 3 
(1971)(listing cases in which "the Court has taken judicial 
notice of the importance of a transcript in a variety of 
circumstances"); Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367, 369, 89 
S.Ct. 580, 582, 21 L.Ed.2d 601 (1969)(recognizing that a 
transcript rather than reliance on memory is required to 
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effectively pursue a request for a second hearing); Williams v. 
Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458 (1969)(indicating that misdemeanor 
defendant's right to appeal is effectively denied, in violation 
of equal protection, where he is not provided with a transcript 
of the trial). 
Numerous courts in other jurisdictions have recognized that 
a transcript is critical to appellate review, and have reversed 
convictions where an adequate transcript is not available. See 
e.g. United States v. Selva, 559 F.2d 1303, 1306 (5th Cir. 1977); 
United States v. Knox, 456 F.2d 1024 (8th Cir. 1972); Parrott v. 
United States, 314 F.2d 46 (10th Cir. 1963); Wester v. State, 368 
So.2d 938 (Fla. App. 1979); Montford v. State, 298 S.E.2d 319 
(Ga. App. 1982); State v. Perry, 381 N.W.2d 609 (Wis. App. 1985); 
People v. Bricrqs, 557 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App. Div. 1990) . 
The United States Supreme Court has also rejected the notion 
that requiring a criminal defendant to rely on memory to 
reconstruct the proceedings below adequately preserves the right 
to appeal. See Gardner, 393 U.S. at 369 (pointing out that 
reliance on memory is not sufficient for review of trial court 
proceedings); Britt, 4 04 U.S. at 434 (indicating that the Court 
has "repeatedly rejected the suggestion that in order to render 
effective assistance, counsel must have a perfect memory or keep 
exhaustive notes of the testimony given at trial). In rejecting 
the claim that a state prisoner should rely on his memory of a 
hearing rather than obtain a transcript, the Court stated: 
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Without a transcript the petitioner, as he prepared his 
application to the appellate court, would have only his 
lay memory of what transpired before the Superior 
Court. For an effective presentation of his case he 
would need the findings of the Superior Court and the 
evidence that had been weighed and rejected in order to 
present his case in the most favorable light. 
Certainly a lawyer, accustomed to precise points of law 
and nuances in testimony, would be lost without such a 
transcript, save perhaps for the unusual and 
exceptional case. The lawyer, having lost below, would 
be conscious of the skepticism that prevails above when 
a second hearing is sought and would as sorely need the 
transcript in petitioning for a hearing before the 
appellate court as he would if the merits of an appeal 
were at stake. A layman hence needs the transcript 
even more. 
Gardner, 393 U.S. at 369 (footnotes omitted and emphasis added). 
While Utah R. App. P. 11(g) provides a procedure that may be 
utilized when a transcript is unavailable, that procedure is not 
appropriate for this case. The procedure is discretionary, as 
evidenced by the use of the term "may." Petitioner chose not to 
utilize the procedure because any resulting record would not 
adequately cover all of the details of the trial. The state 
agreed that a new trial was necessary, and stipulated to a new 
trial rather than requesting that the parties attempt to 
reconstruct the record. 
Requiring parties to reconstruct the record, while 
appropriate in circumstances where a minor part of the record is 
missing or the testimony was straightforward, is not appropriate 
in circumstances such as these where half of the trial is 
missing, and subtle nuances in the testimony make or break 
Joseph's claim that the state failed to prove its case. Indeed, 
this is not one of the "unusual or exceptional case [s]" (Gardner, 
14 
393 U.S. at 369) where a transcript is unnecessary. Instead, a 
transcript rather than more general memories is critical in order 
to adequately review this conviction. 
Appellant docketed two issues in the Court of Appeals: 
A. Whether there was insufficient evidence for the 
jury to convict Appellant of Aggravated Assault. 
B. Whether the trial court erred in failing to find 
that it had lost jurisdiction and failing to remand the 
case back to juvenile court. 
The first issue, insufficient evidence, turns on subtle nuances 
in the testimony. Gilbert, the victim's close friend, was 
standing next to Rocky when he was stabbed. Gilbert identified, 
Zeb, not Petitioner, as the stabber. According to Gilbert, Zeb 
took several swings at Rocky and hit Rocky in the neck. Rocky 
collapsed after being hit by Zeb, and no one made contact with 
Rocky after that. Gilbert testified that Joseph did not hit 
Rocky. 
Zeb, who was identified by Gilbert as the only person who 
could have possibly stabbed Rocky, did not testify on the first 
day of trial, and instead claimed the Fifth Amendment protection. 
Moreover, the evidence on the first day of trial, when viewed in 
the light most favorable to the state, failed to prove that 
Joseph committed an aggravated assault. 
Zeb's testimony on the second day of trial was apparently 
the only testimony that even arguably suggested that Joseph was 
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in a position to stab Rocky.2 Zeb had previously been 
inconsistent in statements to the officers and at preliminary 
hearing regarding statements made by Joseph and Joseph's 
purported role. At trial, Zeb did not directly identify Joseph 
as the stabber and instead made more subtle statements as to what 
he claimed he saw Joseph do, and as to where Joseph was located 
in relation to Rocky. The state may remember those statements as 
essentially "identifying" Joseph as the stabber whereas defense 
counsel may remember those statements as not identifying Joseph 
and instead simply indicating that Joseph was more involved in 
the brawl than Gilbert had indicated. The specific statements 
made by Zeb when he testified, not the generalities remembered 
eight months later in an attempt to reconstruct the record, are 
critical for reviewing Joseph's claim of insufficient evidence. 
Additionally, because Zeb made inconsistent statements 
regarding statements attributed to Joseph and the incident 
itself, cross-examination of Zeb regarding his inconsistencies 
was an important aspect of this trial. A review of the precise 
questions and answers on cross-examination is critical not only 
to a determination of whether the state presented sufficient 
evidence to sustain the conviction, but also for a determination 
as to whether those issues were adequately explored by defense 
counsel. An attempted reconstruction of the record based on a 
2
 While Joshua Knox thought Joseph might have been wearing 
a bulletproof vest and maybe had a knife, this testimony did not 
place Joseph at the scene nor indicate that Joseph had stabbed 
Rocky. 
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general memory of the nature of cross-examination deprives Joseph 
of an adequate review of his insufficiency claim, and also 
deprives him of a review of the cross-examination to ascertain 
that defense counsel adequately explored the areas of 
impeachment. 
The second docketed issue involves a claim that after the 
jury convicted Joseph of a form of aggravated assault which is 
not a Serious Youth Offender offense, the district court judge 
was required to remand the case to juvenile court. The jury 
instruction on aggravated assault reflected the elements of both 
the second and third degree felony forms of aggravated assault. 
While the second degree felony form of aggravated assault is a 
Serious Youth Offender crime, the third degree felony form is 
not. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(1)(a) (1996). Because the 
trial judge could not ascertain from the instruction which form 
of aggravated assault was found by the jury, the judge imposed 
conviction for the third degree felony. While Appellant's 
position is that the judge's finding is conclusive and supports 
his argument that the case should have been remanded to the 
juvenile court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-603(14) (1996) 
since Joseph was not convicted of a Serious Youth Offender 
offense over which the district court has jurisdiction, the state 
and appellate court may desire a complete transcript of the trial 
when reviewing this claim. 
The incompleteness of the transcript raises other areas of 
concern which cannot be adequately addressed by an attempted 
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reconstruction of the record. For instance, the instructions 
raise possible claims which cannot be adequately reviewed without 
a complete record. The state originally charged Joseph with 
Attempted Murder. The state relied on this charge as the basis 
for binding Joseph over to adult court under the Serious Youth 
Offender Act. The state thereafter apparently requested a lesser 
included instruction for an offense which would not have given 
the district court jurisdiction over Joseph under the Serious 
Youth Offender Act. The propriety of such a request by the state 
and the validity of the lesser conviction is an issue which 
cannot be adequately explored under the existing record and which 
may evade review if reconstruction is mandated. 
It is also unclear from the existing record which of the 
exhibits were actually admitted, or the import of the various 
exhibits. For instance, state's exhibits 20 and 21 show two 
different photo arrays. It is not clear whether those were 
admitted, who they were shown to, or whether selections were 
made. State's exhibit 20 appears to be Zeb Smith (compare 
picture in State's Exhibit 6 which was identified as Zeb Smith 
(R. 141:117) with circled picture of state's exhibit 20). That 
picture is circled and signed by Rocky Vigil, the victim in this 
case, suggesting that Rocky selected Zeb as the perpetrator. 
Any attempt at reconstruction would take a significant 
amount of time since testimony of several witnesses, 
clarification of the background and impact of various exhibits, 
and reconsideration of all legal arguments would have to be made. 
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Because an entire half of the trial, covering a full day, is 
missing, any attempt at reconstruction would not only take a long 
time, but would also necessarily miss many of the details of the 
trial. The Court of Appeals' mandate that this case should be 
remanded for reconstruction of the record is fundamentally 
unfair, and deprives Joseph of his state constitutional right to 
appeal since he will not receive a full review of the proceedings 
if the order is upheld. Moreover, Joseph's right to equal 
protection is violated since other defendants in similar 
circumstances are afforded a full review. See Williams, 395 U.S. 
458 (equal protection violation where defendant is not provided 
with transcript of misdemeanor trial). 
The Court of Appeals erred in denying Petitioner's motion 
for summary reversal based on the incomplete record, as 
stipulated to by the state. Petitioner respectfully requests 
that this Court grant his petition for writ of certiorari, 
reverse the Court of Appeals order, and reverse his conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals incorrectly concluded that an attempted 
reconstruction of this record would adequately preserve 
Petitioner's right to appeal. Because the appellate issues are 
fact specific and based on nuances in the testimony, general 
memories of what occurred fail to adequately preserve 
Petitioner's right to appeal. Additionally, reconstruction of 
the record deprives Petitioner of the opportunity to have his 
case reviewed for plain error or ineffective assistance of 
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counsel. Reconstruction in all likelihood would take almost as 
much time as retrying the case, and result in an inadequate 
record. Accordingly, Petitioner respectfully requests that this 
Court grant his petition for writ of certiorari, reverse the 
Court of Appeals' order, and reverse his conviction for a new 
trial. 
DATED t h i s Atf-Lt day of December, 1999 . 
Clruu C <AMh/ 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
JOHN O'CONNELL, JR. 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be 
delivered ten copies of the foregoing to the Utah Supreme Court, 
450 South State, 5th Floor, P. 0. Box 140210, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84114-0210, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's 
Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, 
P. O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this JL^LL day 
of December, 1999. 
CM* (. u^h/ 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED to the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Attorney-





JOAN C. WATT (3967) 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MOTION FOR SUMMARY REVERSAL 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
V. : 
JOSEPH P. TUNZI, : Case No. 990647-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
COMES NOW Defendant/Appellant, JOSEPH P. TUNZI, by and 
through counsel, JOAN C. WATT, and moves the Court pursuant to 
Utah R. App. P. 10 and 2 to summarily reverse his conviction. 
This motion is made on the following grounds, as set forth more 
fully in the attached Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Reversal. 
1. A transcript of the proceedings for the second day of 
trial does not exist. 
2. On the first day of trial, which was recorded and for 
which a transcript exists, none of the witnesses identified 
Appellant/Defendant Joseph Tunzi as the person who stabbed the 
victim. In fact, the victim's friend, who was within a foot of 
the victim when he was stabbed, identified Zebulin Smith as the 
only person who hit the victim. 
Utah Court of Appeals 
OCT 2 2 1393 
Julia D'Alesandro 
Clerk of the Court 
3. On the second day of trial, five witnesses testified, 
the defense made a motion for a directed verdict, the jury 
instructions were read, and the parties gave closing arguments. 
R. 77. 
4. Appellant's Article I, section 12 right to appeal is 
violated by the absence of a transcript. 
5. Appellant did not learn of the missing transcript until 
more than ten days after filing the docketing statement. 
WHEREFORE, Appellant JOSEPH P. TUNZI respectfully requests 
that his conviction be reversed and the case remanded for a new 
trial. 
SUBMITTED this *Z~JL day of October, 1999. 
^ ^ 3 > 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be 
delivered a copy of the foregoing to the Utah Attorney General's 
Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, 
P. 0. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this 32~JL day 
of October, 1999. 
Q k C>(M/ 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED this day of October, 1999. 
DELIVER® 3 ^ 
- i 'G«3 
C.i L 
!-P V. LuP^t ,r 
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ADDENDUM B 
•V \ * 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Joseph P. Tunzi, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
FILED 
NOV ? o i99s 
COURT OF APPEALS 
ORDER OF REMAND 
Case No. 990647-CA 
Before Judges Greenwood, Bench, and Orme. 
This matter is before the court on Tunzi1s motion for 
summary reversal. He asks that we reverse the judgment against 
him and order a new trial because the trial court cannot locate 
the videotape of the second day of a two day trial. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the matter is temporarily remanded 
to the trial court for preparation and approval of "a statement 
of evidence or proceedings" pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 11(g). 
DATED this .^Q day of November, 1999. 
FOR THE COURT: 
f&n&Ct tO.ti&^A^ 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on November 30, 1999, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand-delivered to a personal 
representative of the Legal Defender's Office to be delivered to 
the party listed below: 
JOHN D O'CONNELL, JR 
JOAN C. WATT 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 E 500 S STE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand-
delivered to a personal representative of the Attorney General's 
Office to be delivered to the party listed below: 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited 
in the United States mail to the trial court listed below: 
HONORABLE JUDITH S. ATHERTON 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE 
450 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 18 60 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860 
and 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE 
ATTN: SUZY CARLSON 
450 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 18 60 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860 
Dated this November 30, 1999. 
By ~r- S 
Deputy Clerk 
±(W 
Case No. 990647 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, 981926150 
ADDENDUM C 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Article I, Section 12 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Article VIII, Section 1 
Section 1. [Judicial powers — Courts.] 
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court, in a trial 
court of general jurisdiction known as the district court, and in such other 
courts as the Legislature by statute may establish. The Supreme Court, the 
district court, and such other courts designated by statute shall be courts of 
record. Courts not of record shall also be established by statute. 
78-56-105. Record of court proceedings — Duties of court 
reporter. 
(1) The Judicial Council shall by rule provide for the means of maintaining 
the record of proceedings in the courts of record by oflEdal court reporters or by 
electronic recording devices. 
(2) The official court reporter assigned to a session of court shall take full 
verbatim stenographic notes of the session, except when the judge dispenses 
with the verbatim record. 
(3) The oflEdal court reporter shall immediately file with the clerk of the 
court the original stenographic notes of the court session and the computer 
disk on which the notes are stored. If not already on file with the clerk of the 
court, the official court reporter shall file a computer disk containing the 
reporter's most current dictionary showing the meaning of the reporter's 
stenographic notes. 
(4) Upon request and the payment of fees established by Section 78-56-108, 
the oflEdal court reporter shall transcribe the stenographic notes or video or 
audio recording of the court session and furnish the transcript to the request-
ing party. 
78-3a-602. Serious youth offender — Procedure. 
(1) Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or attorney 
general charging a minor 16 years of age or older with a felony shall be by 
criminal information and filed in the juvenile court if the information charges 
any of the following offenses: 
(a) any felony violation of: 
(i) Section 76-6-103, aggravated arson; 
(ii) Subsection 76-5-103(l)(a), aggravated assault, involving inten-
tionally causing serious bodily injury to another, 
(iii) Section 76-5-302, aggravated kidnaping; 
(iv) Section 76-6-203, aggravated burglary; 
(v) Section 76-6-302, aggravated robbery; 
(vi) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault; 
(vii) Section 76-10-508, discharge of a firearm from a vehicle; 
(viii) Section 76-5-202, attempted aggravated murder, or 
(ix) Section 76-5-203, attempted murder; or 
(b) an offense other than those listed in Subsection (l)(a) involving the 
use of a dangerous weapon which would be a felony if committed by an 
adult, and the minor has been previously adjudicated or convicted of an 
offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon which also would have 
been a felony if committed by an adult. 
(2) All proceedings before the juvenile court related to charges filed under 
Subsection (1) shall be conducted in conformity with the rules established by 
the Utah Supreme Court. 
(3) (a) If the information alleges the violation of a felony listed in Subsec-
tion (1), the state shall have the burden of going forward with its case and 
the burden of proof to establish probable cause to believe that one of the 
crimes listed in Subsection (1) has been committed and that the defendant 
committed it. If proceeding under Subsection (l)(b), the state shall have 
the additional burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the defendant has previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense 
involving the use of a dangerous weapon. 
(b) If the juvenile court judge finds the state has met its burden under 
this subsection, the court shall order that the defendant be bound over and 
held to answer in the district court in the same manner as an adult unless 
the juvenile court judge finds that all of the following conditions exist: 
(i) the minor has not been previously adjudicated delinquent for an 
offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a 
felony if committed by an adult; 
(ii) that if the offense was committed with one or more other 
persons, the minor appears to have a lesser degree of culpability than 
the codefendants; and 
(iii) that the minor's role in the offense was not committed in a 
violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner. 
(c) Once the state has met its burden under this subsection as to a 
showing of probable cause, the defendant shall have the burden of going 
forward and presenting evidence as to the existence of the above condi-
tions. 
(d) If the juvenile court judge finds by clear and convincing evidence 
that all the above conditions are satisfied, the court shall so state in its 
findings and order the minor held for trial as a minor and shall proceed 
upon the information as though it were a juvenile petition. 
(4) If the juvenile court judge finds that an offense has been committed, but 
that the state has not met its burden of proving the other criteria needed to 
bind the defendant over under Subsection (1), the juvenile court judge shall 
order the defendant held for trial as a minor and shall proceed upon the 
information as though it were a juvenile petition. 
(5) At the time of a bind over to district court a criminal warrant of arrest 
shall issue. The defendant shall have the same right to bail as any other 
criminal defendant and shall be advised of that right by the juvenile court 
judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in accordance with Title 77, 
Chapter 20, Bail. 
(6) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury charging a violation under 
this section, the preliminary examination held by the juvenile court judge need 
not include a finding of probable cause that the crime alleged in the indictment 
was committed and that the defendant committed it, but the juvenile court 
shall proceed in accordance with this section regarding the additional consid-
erations listed in Subsection (3)(b). 
(7) When a defendant is charged with multiple criminal offenses in the same 
information or indictment and is bound over to answer in the district court for 
one or more charges under this section, other offenses arising from the same 
criminal episode and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged 
against him shall be considered together with those charges, and where the 
court finds probable cause to believe that those crimes have been committed 
and that the defendant committed them, the defendant shall also be bound 
over to the district court to answer for those charges. 
(8) A minor who is bound over to answer as an adult in the district court 
under this section or on whom an indictment has been returned by a grand 
jury, is not entitled to a preliminary examination in the district court. 
(9) Allegations contained in the indictment or information that the defen-
dant has previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the 
use of a dangerous weapon, or is 16 years of age or older, are not elements of 
the criminal offense and do not need to be proven at trial in the district court. 
(10) The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the Division of Youth 
Corrections regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the 
juvenile when there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of the 
charges in the district court. 
RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
Rule 4-201. Record of proceedings. 
Intent: 
To establish the means of maintaining the official record of court proceedings 
in all courts of record. 
To establish the manner of selection and operation of electronic devices. 
To establish the procedure for requesting a transcript for a purpose other 
than for an appeal. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all courts of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Guidelines for court reporting methods. The official verbatim record of 
court proceedings shall be maintained in accordance with the following 
guidelines: 
(A) Except as provided in this rule, a video recording system shall maintain 
the official verbatim record of all District Court proceedings. 
(B) An official court reporter or approved substitute court reporter shall 
maintain the official verbatim record of District Court proceedings using real 
time reporting methods in computer integrated courtrooms (CIO in the 
following proceedings: 
(i) all evidentiary hearings and trial proceedings and all phases of sentenc-
ing in capital felonies; 
(ii) all evidentiary hearings after arraignment and trial proceedings in first 
degree felonies; and 
(iii) at the judge's discretion, subject to availability of a court reporter and 
CIC equipment, 
(a) in cases in which the judge finds that an appeal of the case is likely, 
regardless of the outcome in the trial court; 
(b) in cases in which the judge determines there is a substantial likelihood 
a video recording would jeopardize the right to a fair trial or hearing; or 
(c) in any other proceeding or portion of a proceeding, upon a showing of 
good cause. 
(C) An audio recording system shall maintain the official verbatim record of 
all proceedings in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. 
(D)(i) An audio recording system shall maintain the official verbatim record 
in proceedings of the district court in which the Judicial Council has previously 
determined that the volume of cases in a courtroom is not sufficient to justify 
the cost of installation of a video recording system. 
(ii) An audio recording system may be used to maintain the official verbatim 
record in any hearing in a small claims case. 
(E) An audio recording system shall maintain the official verbatim record of 
all proceedings in the juvenile court, except a juvenile court judge may use, 
subject to availability, an official court reporter or a video recording system: 
(i) if an appeal of the case is likely regardless of the outcome in the trial 
court, or 
(ii) in any other proceeding or portion of a proceeding, upon a showing of 
good cause. 
(F) When the judge determines that the privacy interests of the victim of a 
crime, a party in a civil case or a witness outweigh the interest of the public in 
access to a video record of the person, the judge may record the proceeding or 
portion of the proceeding by use of a court reporter or an audio recording 
system. 
(G) Reporters shall be assigned to cover courtroom proceedings as set forth 
above. In the event of a conflict in the request for an official court reporter, the 
trial court executive or managing reporter shall confer with the presiding 
judge, who shall resolve the conflict. 
(H) A recording technology other than the presumed technology may be 
used if the presumed technology is not available. The use of a technology other 
than the presumed technology shall not form the basis of an issue on appeal. 
(1) The Administrative Office shall periodically study the state of the art of 
electronic recording technology and technology employed in computer inte-
grated courtrooms and make recommendations to the Judicial Council of 
systems to be approved. 
(2) Operating and maintaining the electronic recording system. 
(A) The clerk of the court or designee shall operate the electronic recording 
system in the courtroom so as to record the proceedings before the court 
accurately. The operator shall be trained in the operation of the system. A 
separate log of each recorded proceeding shall be maintained on a form 
approved by the Administrative Office. 
(B) When a video recording system is used to maintain the official verbatim 
record of court proceedings, at least two original recordings shall be made. One 
original recording and log shall be filed with the clerk of the court as part of the 
official court record. A second original recording shall be kept in a secure, 
off-site storage area. The clerk of the court shall keep the original recording at 
the courthouse in accordance with the record retention schedule. When an 
audio recording system is used to maintain the official verbatim record of court 
proceedings one original recording shall be made. 
(C) If a proceeding is recorded by a court reporter, an electronic recording of 
the proceeding shall not be made, except that a judge may direct a single 
original of an electronic recording be made as part of the judge's notes for 
personal use in the deliberative process under Section 63-2-103(18)(b)(ix). 
(3) The official court record. 
(A) In proceedings in which a video or audio recording system is used, the 
court's original video or audio tape and accompanying log shall be the official 
court record. In proceedings in which an official court reporter is used, the 
reporter's shorthand notes shall be the official court record. The Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure govern the record on appeal. 
(B) The official court record shall be filed with the clerk of the court. 
(C) The clerk of the court shall be the custodian of the official court record 
and may release the official court record only to a judge, the clerk of the 
appellate court, the trial court executive, or the official court transcriber. The 
clerk shall enter in the docket the name of the recipient and when the official 
court record was released and returned. Obtaining a copy of the official court 
record shall be governed by rules regulating access to court records. 
(4) Requests for transcripts. 
(A) A request for transcript for an appeal is governed by Utah R.App.P. 11 
and Utah R.App.P. 12. 
(B) A request for transcript for any purpose other than for an appeal shall 
be accompanied by the fee established by Section 78-56-4 and filed with the 
court executive. A request for an expedited transcript shall be accompanied by 
the fee established by Section 78-56-4 and filed with the court executive. The 
court executive shall assign the preparation of the transcript in the same 
manner as Utah R.App.P. 12. 
(Repealed and reenacted effective April 1, 1997; amended effective April 1, 
1998.) 
ADDENDUM D 
JOHN O'CONNELL, JR. (6955) 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : DOCKETING STATEMENT 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
JOSEPH P. TUNZI, : Case No. 99 -CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
(1) DATE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT OR ORDER APPEALED FROM: 
June 9, 1999. 
NATURE OF POSTJUDGMENT MOTION(S) PURSUANT TO RULES 50(a) OR 
(b) , 52(b), 54(b), OR 59, UTAH R. CIV. P., OR RULES 24 OR 26, 
UTAH R. CRIM. P., AND DATE(S) FILED: None. 
DATE AND EFFECT OF ORDER(S) DISPOSING OF POSTJUDGMENT 
MOTION(S): Inapplicable. 
DATE OF FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL: July 8, 1999. 
(2) JURISDICTION: The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in 
this matter pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 26(2) (a) and Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996), whereby the defendant in a district 
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court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals 
from a final order for anything other than a first degree or 
capital felony. Appellant was convicted of Aggravated Assault, 
FILED 
Uta* •->«»* of Appeals 
JUL 11 1999 
Julia D'Alssandro 
Clerk of the Court 
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
103(1) (b) (Supp. 1998) . 
(3) NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING: This appeal is from a final 
judgment of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Judith S. Atherton 
presiding. 
(4) STATEMENT OF FACTS MATERIAL TO A CONSIDERATION OF THE 
QUESTION(S) PRESENTED: 
On November 1, 1998, at 2817 South Alden Street, John R. 
Vigil ("Vigil") was hot-tubbing with some friends. One of those 
friends, Gilbert Leyba ("Leyba") started to talk to some girls 
that were from a party across the street. Two individuals, 
identified as the defendant Joseph Tunzi ("Joseph" or 
"Appellant") and his cousin Zebulin Smith ("Zeb"), approached and 
confronted Vigil and Leyba. Words were exchanged. Both Joseph 
and Zeb were standing in front of Vigil. Vigil was suddenly hit 
a couple of times and stabbed in the neck. After the assault, 
both Joseph and Zeb fled in a vehicle. Later that night, Zeb 
returned to the scene and was arrested. Leyba told the officers 
that arrested Zeb that he was one hundred percent positive that 
Zeb was the person who stabbed Vigil. 
Zeb testified at trial that he did not stab anyone. He said 
that as he was walking away from the confrontation, he saw out of 
the corner of his eye Joseph hit Vigil. He also stated that 
later that night, Joseph said he had stabbed someone. Other than 
Zeb, no one testified that they saw Joseph hit or stab Vigil. 
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On April 23, 1999, Appellant, who was a juvenile when the 
offense was committed, was tried as an adult under the serious 
youth offender statute. The jury returned a verdict of not 
guilty to Attempted Murder and a verdict of guilty to the lesser 
included count of Aggravated Assault. The verdict form did not 
indicate whether the Aggravated Assault was a second or a third 
degree felony. 
On June 9, 1999, Appellant made a motion for a new trial 
based on the vague verdict form. The court denied the motion but 
ruled that the conviction was on the third degree felony. 
Appellant then made a motion that the court had lost jurisdiction 
under the serious youth offender statute and that the case should 
be remanded to the juvenile court. The court denied that motion 
and sentenced Appellant to prison. 
(5) ISSUE (S) PRESENTED BY THE APPEAL AND APPLICABLE 
STANDARD(S) OF REVIEW: 
A. Whether there was insufficient evidence for the 
jury to convict Appellant of Aggravated Assault. 
Standard of Review: In reviewing the sufficiency of 
the evidence, we view the evidence and the inferences 
reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to 
the jury verdict. See State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70 (Utah 
1993) . 
B. Whether the trial court erred in failing to find 
that it had lost jurisdiction and failing to remand the case 
back to the juvenile court. 
Standard of Review: This is an issue of statutory 
construction, and therefor is a question of law reviewable 
under a correctness standard. See State v. Hudeceh, 965 
P.2d 1069 (Utah App. 1998). 
3 
(6) DETERMINATIVE LAW: 
State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 951 (Utah 1993); 
State v. Pavne. 964 P.2d 327 (Utah App. 1998); 
State v. Wood. 868 P.2d 70 (Utah 1993); 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-601 (Supp. 1998); 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602 (1996) ; 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(10) (1996). 
(7) RELATED OR PRIOR APPEALS: None. 
ATTACHMENTS: Sentence, Judgment, Commitment; Notice of 
Appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31 day of July, 1999. 
ypOEN O'CONNELL, JR. 
^Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOHN O'CONNELL, JR., hereby certify that I have caused to 
be delivered a copy of the foregoing to the Utah Attorney 
General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 
6th Floor, P. 0. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, 
this X.Z~JL day of July, 1999. 
Qjac^ 
rOHN O'CONNELL, JR. 
DELIVERED this 2^- day of July, 1999. 
5 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH P TUNZI, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 981926150 FS 
Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
Date: June 9, 1999 
PRESENT 
Clerk: chrisc 
Prosecutor: FRED BERMESTER 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s) : JOHN OCfCONNELL 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 13, 1981 
Video 
Tape Number: 1 Tape Count: 10.15 
CHARGES 
1. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT (amended) - 3rd Degree Felony 
- Disposition: 04/26/1999 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 3rd 
Degree Felony/ the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Commitment is to begin immediately. 
PaCTP 1 
Case No: 981926150 
Date: Jun 09, 1999 
SENTENCE FINE 

















The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $150.00 
Pay in behalf of: LDA 
Pay fine to The Court. 
Dated this _J day of a XMsL. 
"n-a/^rei O Mz*C»f-\ 
JOHN O'CONNELL, JR. (6955) 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
-fir--* r 7 , 
t , 1 . J - « • 
' 7 1 u w-.' i u \ » • i«- »« * 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JOSEPH P. TUNZI, 
Defendant/Appellant 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 981926150FS 
HONORABLE JUDITH S. ATHERTON 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that JOSEPH P. TUNZI, Defendant/ 
Appellant in the above-entitled action, hereby appeals to the 
Utah Court of Appeals from the final judgment rendered against 
him on the 9th day of June, 1999, by the Honorable Judith S. 
Atherton, Judge, Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. 
DATED this 2tL day of July, 1999. 
M/ 
OHN O'CONNELL, JR. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOHN O'CONNELL, JR., hereby certify that I have caused to 
be delivered a copy of the foregoing to the District Attorney's 
Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and the 
Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 
300 South, 6th Floor, P. O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114-0854, this #&* day of July, 1999. 
HN OrCONNELL, JR. 





LAURA B. DUPAIX - #5195 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM, #1231 
Utah Attorney General 
160 E. 300 S., 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
Attorneys for PlaintifffAppellee 
I IN J HI', I I AH i niiR'l Ml MTI U S 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff7Appellee, 
v. 
JOSEPH p. TUNZI 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
MOTION, STIPULATION AND ORDER 
FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME FOR 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY REVERSAL 
Case No. 990647-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Appellee, by and through its counsel, Laura B. Dupaix, Assistant Attorney General, 
MU)M:S tin, C{)UT\ lor u !*wi;i\ enl;in.'rnicni ol'limt. unhin which in file iis response to 
appellant^ Motion for Summary Reversal. The reason for this motion is that appellant seeks 
a reversal because part of the record is missing. The Sta.te would like additional time to try to 
tind the missing pail nl I he ia mil < ounscl lor .ippelljuit has Mipulaleil lo this extension of 
time. 




.AURA B. DUPAIX 
Assistant Attorney General 
fefcfcV 
LAURA B. DUPAIX - #5195 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM, #1231 
Utah Attorney General 
160 E. 300 S., 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : STIPULATION FOR ENLARGEMENT 
OF TIME FOR STATE'S RESPONSE 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
REVERSAL 
v. : 
JOSEPH P. TUNZI, : Case No. 990647-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JOAN C. WATT, counsel for appellant, Joseph P. Tunzi and LAURA B. DUPAIX, 
Assistant Attorney General, hereby stipulate that the State may have a 15-day enlargement 
of time in which to submit its response to appellant's Motion for Summary Reversal. 
Appellee's response is due on November 5, 1999. Appellee's brief will now be due on 
November 20, 1999. 
Dated this day of A W w , ^ i , 1999. 
CJM^J^U LilUffa 
JOAN C. WATT U ^/LAURA B. DUPAL 
Counsel for Kalmar Assistant Attorney General 
ADDENDUM F 
/ 
LAURA B. DUPADC - #5195 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM, #1231 
Utah Attorney General 
160 E. 300 S., 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
IN THE UTAH COURT Oh APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : STATE'S RESPONSE TO 
APPELLANT'S MOTION 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : FOR SUMMARY REVERSAL 
v. : 
Case No. 990647-1 A 
JOSEPH P. TUNZI, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
The State of Utah, through its counsel Laura B. Dupaix, Assistant Attorney General, 
does not oppose appellant's motion for summary reversal and remand for a new trial on the 
ground that a transcript ol the seiond <\u\ ol trial is unavailable Because appellant is 
asserting that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, the absence of a transcript 
for a full day of the two-day trial makes appellate review and reconstruction of the record 
difficult, if not impossible. See State v. Verikokides, 925 P.2d 1255,1256 (Utah 1996); State 
v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 446-47 (Utah 1983). It appears, therefore, that to preserve 
appellant's state constitutional right to an appeal, the appropriate remedy is a new trial. See 
Verikokides, 925 P.2d at 1256; Taylor, 664 P.2d at 446-47. 




lURA B. DUPAIX 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
2 
MAILING CERTIFICA I 1 
I hereby ecrtih thai on Ihis '^^dav of Jlfk^^i^Y' , 1999,1 mailed, 
postage prepaid, an accurate copy of the foregoing State's response to the following: 
Joan C. Watt 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Courtesy Copy t<> 
Fred Burmester 
Deputy District Attorney 
SALT DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
231 East 400 South, Lower Level 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 - 7 - ) 
